Inward Foreign Direct Investments and Productivity Growth in Japan by Yukako Murakami & Kyoji Fukao
 
































Hitotsubashi University Research Unit 
for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences 
A 21st-Century COE Program 
 
Institute of Economic Research   
Hitotsubashi University 
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603 Japan 












  Firstly, this paper shows that before M&A the foreign firms value the facility and scale economy in 
target firms which have greater capital stock and sales in the host country. Secondly, out-in M&A firms 
acquired by foreign firms saw an improvement in their business efficiency after the acquisition. This 
finding suggests that out-in M&As involve a transfer of business resources or technological knowledge 
that help to further lift the efficiency of firms.  
 
 
JEL classification: F1 F2 O3 
Keywords: FDI, Total Factor Productivity, Merger and acquisition, Selection Hypothesis, Spillover  
 
 
                                                      
1  Ph. D. in Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University   
   E-mail:ged9205@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp  
2  Professor, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University  
1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a large increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) by firms worldwide, as 
companies transfer production abroad. There are a number of reasons for this increase: firstly; the firms 
make profits to expand their business opportunities and new discoveries through R&D activities in the 
foreign countries. Second, the opening and rise of China and India provide firms not only with growing 
markets but also with large pool of cheap labor. And third, countries in Eastern Europe and throughout the 
developing world have been implementing policies to attract foreign firms in order to strengthen their 
export competitiveness and benefit from technology spillovers. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form 
of long-term international capital movement which is accompanied by investors’ intangible assets.
3 
Examples of such intangible assets are the stock of technological knowledge accumulated by R&D or the 
accumulation of marketing know-how from past advertising activity, and it is expected that the recipient 
country will benefit from such inflows. 
As shown in the figure1, the ratio of FDI to GDP of Japan is lower than the other developed countries. 
Japan historically restricted free entry of firms in the market. Therefore it limited the inward FDI. Lall 
(2003) analyzed the determinants of the export competitiveness of the nation by discussing two factors, 
one of which is the firms’ own research activities in their home country and the other is  the degree of 
inward FDI as the means of technology transfer. According to his analysis, Japan focused the indigenous 
research activity to gain high technology compared to the other OECD countries. However, as the table 1 
                                                      
3 See, for example, Caves (1996) and Dunning (1992) on the standard theory of foreign direct investment. 
  2shows, in recent years Japan is also to receive the benefit of globalization gradually.  
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  3Table 1 Inward FDI in Japan  
1950-95 96 97 98 99 2000 Total
Manufacturing Total 2,065.4 311.1 267.4 312.6 979.7 790.7 5,324.0
Food 65.3 0.3 2.2 25.8 1.5 0.0 110.0
Textiles 13.4 0.9 1.9 3.6 0.2 2.4 23.8
Rubber and leather products 20.7 10.7 18.8 4.8 7.0 1.1 82.1
Chemicals 679.4 69.5 74.0 39.7 60.3 178.8 1,272.5
Petroleum products 127.5 8.2 5.8 8.4 13.5 253.4 443.3
Stone, clay and glass products 21.3 0.0 0.7 - 5.7 0.0 30.0
Metal products 102.4 52.8 0.3 2.0 17.9 1.9 219.6
Machinery 952.2 155.8 145.2 212.9 865.2 351.9 2,978.1
Others 83.1 12.9 18.5 15.3 8.5 1.2 164.5
Non-Manufacturing Total 1,503.0 459.5 410.8 1,027.8 1,419.6 2,334.4 7,880.0
Construction 16.0 0.0 0.3 1.4 2.2 0.0 20.5
Real estate agents 1 2 6 . 72 6 . 54 8 . 24 1 . 61 6 . 83 4 . 6 3 3 9
Commercial and trading 591.8 166.4 99.6 175.9 348.5 276.1 2,027.8
Services 273.1 236.0 88.8 318.1 205.8 236.5 1,526.4
Transportations 24.6 1.0 0.4 6.1 2.2 5.7 48.3
Telecommunications 39.7 2.1 3.3 16.8 330.0 750.8 1,155.1
Finance and insurance 316.7 27.3 161.6 456.9 511.5 1,029.3 2,595.2
Others 114.7 0.2 8.7 11.1 2.5 1.3 168.0
Total 3,567.8 770.7 678.2 1,340.4 2,399.3 3,125.1 13,203.3
Notes: Notification value of inward foreign direct investment since 1950.




 The actual presence of foreign-owned firms in Japan, which summarized Basic Survey of Business  
Activity
4 edited by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, shows that from 1994 to 1998, 
their number of the foreign-owned firms increased from 180 to 244, while their share in total sales 
expanded from 3.9% to 7.6%. The number of firms which changed its ownership from domestically to 
foreign-owned is 43, who were the targets of out-in M&As. While the number of newly foreign-owned 
firms during this period is 69. Their sales amounted only to 900 billion yen, Out-in M&As thus were 
responsible for most of the 8,800 billion yen increase of foreign-owned firms’ sales. M&As played an 
                                                      
4 Data compilation and estimations were conducted as part of project “Development of a RIETI 
Manufacturing Database and Study of Productivity by Industry” at the Research Institute for Economy, 
Trade and Industry (RIETI).  
  4important role in the expansion of foreign-owned firms’ activities in Japan.   
There are two possible reasons why firms that have been acquired by foreigners through M&As may 
be more productive than domestically-owned ones. The first is that the target companies are more 
productive than the average domestic firm (i.e. foreigners target higher-productivity firms for M&As). 
The second possible reason is that the target companies indeed enjoyed productivity gains through 
resource transfers (technology, management know-how, etc.) from the foreign parent firm after the M&A. 
Therefore, in order to investigate whether inward M&A investment influences host country productivity, 
it is necessary to analyze whether there has been a significant change in the productivity of the target firm 
after the M&A. In addition, it is useful to investigate whether the sales of targeted firms increase after an 
M&A investment: if, as a result of being acquired by a foreign company, the target companies further 
increase their market share, this would lead to a rise in overall productivity in Japan through the share 
effect.  
The aim of this paper is to take a look at the effects of M&A investment and analyze these issues in 
greater detail. The analysis consists of the following components. First, the productivity and other 
business indicators of out-in M&A target firms, in-in M&A target firms (i.e. cases where both the 
acquiring and the acquired firm are domestically-owned), and other firms are compared. Second, business 
indicators before and after the M&A are compared in order to investigate whether out-in M&A target 
firms were already superior to other firms before being acquired. In other words, the selection hypothesis 
is examined. And thirdly, we conducted a regression analysis including the industry dummy variables or 
the passed years after M&A in order to investigate whether firms show an improvement in their business 
  5indicators after the M&A as a result of the transfer of technological knowledge from the foreign parent 
firm.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the method used to measure Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in the analysis 
and offers a summary of the data set. Section.4 compares the simple average between out-in M&A firms 
and the other firms. Section 5 firstly investigates whether out-in M&A target firms are superior to the 
other firms before M&A. Secondly, this section investigates whether firms that were M&A targets saw an 
increase in TFP growth, sales, employment, and improvements in other business performance indicators. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2  Literature Survey and Outline of Research Approach 
A number of studies have empirically examined the effects of M&As on profit ratios and business 
performance. The empirical studies are divided into event studies and those based on balance sheet data. 
Studies relying on the former approach analyze changes in the stock price of the acquiring and the 
acquired firms before and after the announcement of the M&A deal. Studies following the latter approach 
examine business performance indicators such as the current-profit-to-sales ratio, the growth rate of 
profits, ROA, ROE, etc. of both the acquiring and the acquired firm.  
An example of a study using the latter approach is Odagiri and Hase (1988), which analyzes the 
business performance of Japanese manufacturing firms acquired by another firm. They found that M&As 
in the 1980s aimed mainly at business diversification or the continuation of firms in declining industries. 
  6They also analyzed in-in M&As and found that the profit rate and the growth rate of the targeted firms 
declined after the M&A.  
Looking at firms in Britain, Conyon et al. (2002) observed that both the growth of wages and labor 
productivity of domestic firms acquired by foreign firms increased. Chudnovsky and López (2000), in 
their empirical study on firms in Argentina during the 1990s, came to the conclusion that the business 
indicators of firms targeted by out-in M&As showed a better performance than in-in M&A targets and 
other, independent firms. Meanwhile Gugler and Yortoglu (2004) demonstrated that mergers and 
acquisitions are used as a restructuring device. Using data on U.S. and European companies, they found 
that in the case of European companies, employment at the acquired companies on average fell by 10% 
when companed with pre-M&A levels. In contrast, because of lower labor costs, companies saw no need 
to reduce employment levels at acquired U.S. firms. Finally, Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson (2004), in 
their study on the pharmaceuticals industry suggest that M&As have a positive effect on the R&D 
intensity of the acquired company as well as number of patents, which serves as an indicator of R&D 
output. The related studies on M&As use the profit rate and labor productivity, employment, or R&D 
intensity as indicators of business performance rather than total factor productivity. In sum, empirical 
studies on the effect of M&As on acquired companies suggest that business indicators improved after the 
merger or acquisition.  
 
3.  Data Sources and TFP Measurement 
Description of Data Sources and Variables 
  7The paper uses the data set which consists of a panel of firm level data from the Basic Survey of 
Business Activity of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry for the period from 1994 to 1998. The 
survey covers all firms that have more than 50 workers and 30 million yen in capital. This paper 
concentrates on manufacturing firms only. 
When constructing the data set, we excluded firms whose sales, tangible fixed assets, payments, 
material costs (total operating costs minus other costs such as rent, depreciation, wage payments and taxes 
in the statistics) were negative and whose number of workers was less than 50. This leaves us with a total 
of 68,641 observations for the 5-year period (for about 13,700 firm observations in each year).  
    A number of records had to be modified because the foreign-ownership ratio was problematic. For 
example, firms with a foreign-ownership ratio of 33.4% or more in 1994 but 0% in the following years 
were classified as having a foreign-ownership ratio of less than 33.4%. On the other hand, a firm whose 
parent firm’s nationality is recorded, though the foreign-ownership ratio is given as 0%, is counted as 
more than 33.4% foreign-owned (the ratio that we use as the cut-off for our definition of foreign or 
domestic ownership). The choice of this value is based on the fact that if we were to choose a ratio of 50%, 
there would hardly be any firms left that would be counted as foreign. Moreover, 33.4% is the minimum 
share that grants investors veto rights on important matters such as changes in the articles of incorporation, 
the dismissal of COEs, organizational changes, etc. In order to test the robustness of our results, we also 
run a few regressions using 50% as the cut-off ratio. However, it should be noted that even when using the 
33.4% cut-off ratio, data limitations do not allow us to distinguish whether capital investors have any 
management control of firm’s business and whether a firm has a single or multiple foreign owners. 
  8Moreover, as pointed out by Fukao and Amano (2004), there are some firms in the electrical machinery 
industry in which foreigners own more than one-third of shares as portfolio investment; however, the 
number of such firms in the manufacturing sector overall is small.  
 
TFP Measurement  
The discussion now turns to the measurement of TFP that will be used to analyze the international 
activities of heterogeneous firms. In this context, the work by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) and 
by Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) serves as a useful point of departure to devise a way of measuring the 
relative productivity of firms. Caves et al. introduce the concept of a multilateral productivity index, 
which is calculated as follows: subtract average output of the industry, the factor of production of each 
firm, and the average factor of the industry from the output of each firm. The industry average factor 
which is multiplied by the average cost share of the industry is subtracted from each firm’s factor of 
production multiplied by each firm’s cost share. This index is very useful when the object is to compare 
the productivity of more than two firms at a particular point in time. However, it is inappropriate in a 
dynamic context, i.e., when allowing for the passage of time and the entry and exit of firms, which lead to 
changes in the number of observations, in average productivity within the industry, and in the productivity 
of individual firms. Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) overcome this problem by using a Divisia Index, 
which reflects changes in the distribution of productivity and changes in the productivity of the 
representative firm as time passes. Because this paper deals with a longitudinal panel data set, TFP 
measurement based on Good et al.’s approach is appropriate.  
  9Following this example, the TFP level of a firm here is calculated as the difference with the 
representative firm within the same industry. Thus, the TFP level (in logarithmic form) of firm f at time t is 
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where Yft is the output of firm f at time t,we use sales from data set, Xift is factor input i, Sift is the cost share 
of factor i in total costs. The overbar indicates industry averages. The TFP level of each firm is calculated 
using equation (3) which considers not only the relative TFP level compared with a representative firm at 
time t in the same industry but also changes in the productivity distribution as time passes. We use the 
3-digit industry classifications of the Kigyo Kastudo Kihon Chosa.  
The following variables are used to calculate TFP. Output obtained from the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon 
Chosa, while deflators by industry is obtained by dividing nominal output with real output using the IO 
Tables of the Management and Coordination Agency. Capital stock is estimated as follows. First, plant 
and equipment investment (excluding expenses for land and buildings) at the 3-digit-level, obtained from 
Census of Manufactures published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, is divided by the 
SNA deflator and accumulated by the perpetual inventory method. Next, we calculate the real market 
price/nominal book value ratio, which is the real capital stock divided by nominal tangible fixed assets 
  10(book value, end of year) obtained from the Census of Manufactures.  
We use tangible fixed assets from the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa as the real capital stock of each 
firm, which is multiplied by this preceding real market price/nominal book value ratio. We adjust the 
utilization. Cost shares are calculated using capital service price data by industry from the JIP database in 
Fukao et al (2003). 
 Costs for materials are calculated as total operating costs minus other expenses such as rent, wages, 
depreciation and taxes, while material costs at constant prices are obtained in the same way as in the 
calculation for output above. In order to calculate productivity precisely, we exclude raw material, energy 
and other costs from output. The amount of raw materials and energy used reflects firms’ utilization ratio 
which is determined by the demand conditions firms face.  
 Constant labor input is calculated by multiplying the number of employees by the labor hour index of the 
SNA divided by 100. Both 0.1% tails of the distribution of output, capital stock, employee, payment, and 
material are deleted as outliers.  
 
4  Comparison Tests between Out-in M&As and the Other Firms 
Data Set  
This section looks at the performance of domestic firms after they have been acquired by a foreign 
firm, comparing such ‘out-in’ M&As with M&As involving only Japanese firms, i.e. ‘in-in’ M&As, and 
other firms. Out-in M&As here are defined as cases where the foreign-ownership ratio of a firm changed 
from less than to more than 33.3%. In contrast, in-in M&As here are defined as cases where firms 
  11previously had no parent firm but later reported belonging to a Japanese parent firm. In contrast, in-in 
M&As here are defined as cases where firms previously had no parent firm but later reported belonging to 
a Japanese parent firm. It should also be noted that the cut-off ratio for the definition of a parent firm used 
in the Basic Survey of Business Activity for domestic firms is different from that for foreign firms: while 
for foreign firms it is one-third, for domestic firms it is 50%.
5 It should be noted that the definition in this 
paper of out-in M&A and in-in M&A differs because the data set is restricted.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics of our data set on out-in and in-in M&As in the manufacturing 
ector from 1994 to 1998. The number of firms which were in business throughout this period is 10,152
6. 
Out-in M&A target firms are those firms whose foreign-ownership ratio was under 33.4% in 1994 but 
above 33.4% in 1998. Our data set includes 43 such firms. In-in M&A target firms are those firms that had 
no parent firm with an ownership share exceeding 50% in 1994 but did have one in 1998. Our data set 






                                                      
5A further shortcoming of the data is that it allows us only to consider M&A cases where a firm became 
the subsidiary of another firm. Therefore, cases where the unification of management was achieved 
through a merger between equals or a holding company are not considered here.  
6 There is a possibility the firms are counted to exit, if the firms reduce the production of manufacturing 
  12Table 2  Out-In and In-In M&A Target Firms' Share in Total Sales by Industry  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3)/(5)*100 (4)/(5)*100
1998 No. of firms No. of firms Sales of Sales of Total Share of Share of










1 Food 0 34 0 276567.48 14900289.95 0.0 1.9
2 Beverages 1 2 5645.71 96648.57 11651302.47 0.0 0.8
3 Spinning 0 11 0 34337.1 1993638.57 0.0 1.7
4 Textiles 0 12 0 8258.24 1785852.19 0.0 0.5
5 Lumber and wood products 0 3 0 6536.38 955534.24 0.0 0.7
6 Furniture 0 4 0 11961.62 1145921.86 0.0 1.0
7 Pulp, paper and paper prods. 0 17 0 148979.76 5312168.01 0.0 2.8
8 Publishing and printing 4 8 22865.14 50860 8818887.3 0.3 0.6
9 Chemicals 12 18 472610.05 198706.81 25467941.51 1.9 0.8
10 Petroleum products 1 2 246089.53 658191.43 8209450.59 3.0 8.0
11 Plastics 1 21 923.81 99898.48 5105039.15 0.0 2.0
12 Rubber products 1 3 2680.95 4099.1 2476892.95 0.1 0.2
13 Leather and leather products 0 2 0 5054.05 123148.33 0.0 4.1
14 Stone, clay and glass products 1 18 7917.14 66637.9 4880591.24 0.2 1.4
15 Steel 0 8 0 60052.19 9834066.76 0.0 0.6
16 Nonferrous metals 3 7 9444.76 210650.33 6290433.74 0.2 3.3
17 Metal products 0 18 0 80556.19 8128543.02 0.0 1.0
18 General machinery 4 42 13822.67 283060.38 21943895.19 0.1 1.3
19 Electrical machinery 9 68 3182814.15 862130.81 54883065.28 5.8 1.6
20 Transportation machinery  6 44 4809342.93 1385077.14 42425528.39 11.3 3.3
21 Precision machinery 0 5 0 114577.48 3200188.68 0.0 3.6
Total 43 347 8774156.85 4662841.43 239532379.5 3.7 1.9  
 
As shown in Table 2, the greatest number of out-in M&As can be found in the chemical and 
electrical machinery industries. In contrast, the greatest number of in-in M&As took place in the electrical 
machinery sector, followed by the transportation and general machinery industries. Using sales rather than 
number of cases as a yard-stick, the most important industries for out-in M&A activity were transportation, 
electrical machinery and chemicals. On the other hand, in-in M&As were much less concentrated. 
Another interesting point to note is that although there were more cases in-in M&As than out-in M&A, 
the combined sales of out-in M&A target firms were almost twice as large as the combined sales of in-in 
M&A target firms. In other words, the average scale of out-in M&As is much larger than that of in-in 
M&As.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
and classified in the non-manufacturing industry after M&A.  
  13Tests of Averages  
As a first approach to comparing the business performance of out-in and in-in M&A target firms as 
well as other firms, we conduct tests of averages. The results are displayed in Table 3. The business 
performance indicators used are the TFP level in 1994, the TFP level in 1998, the TFP growth rate from 
1994 to 1998, the growth rate of current sales, the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio, the growth rate of 
the wage level, the growth rate of the number of workers, the growth rate of labor productivity, the growth 
rate of the ratio of current profits to tangible fixed assets, the growth rate of tangible fixed assets, the 
growth rate of the R&D intensity, current profits per worker, and the growth rate of the ratio of current 
profits to sales. As above, the TFP level is measured as the deviation from the average of each industry 











  14Table 3 Average Tests of Business Activities of Out-In M&A, In-In M&A and the Other Firms 










TFP level in 1994 （logarithm, deviation from industry average） Out-In M&A 43 -0.019 0.227
In-in M&A 346 -0.024 0.222
Other firms 9753 -0.025 0.193
TFP level in 1998 （logarithm, deviation from industry average） Out-In M&A 43 0.023 0.213
In-in M&A 346 -0.034 0.215
Other firms 9753 -0.021 0.191
TFP growth rate from 1994 to 1998  Out-In M&A 43 0.042 * 0.241
In-in M&A 346 -0.010 0.163
Other firms 9753 0.000 0.148
Growth rate of real sales from 1994 to 1998  Out-In M&A 43 0.160 * ** 0.359
In-in M&A 347 0.046 0.353
Other firms 9762 0.016 0.333
Growth rate of capital-labor ratio from 1994 to 1998  Out-In M&A 43 0.330 * 1.303
In-in M&A 347 0.165 0.882
Other firms 9762 0.121 0.579
Growth rate of wages from 1994 to 1998  Out-In M&A 43 0.289 *** *** 0.578
In-in M&A 347 0.113 0.435
Other firms 9762 0.088 0.384
Growth rate of no. of workers from 1994 to 1998  Out-In M&A 43 -0.040 0.291
In-in M&A 347 -0.039 0.276
Other firms 9762 -0.050 0.229
Growth rate of labor productivity from 1994 to 1998  Out-In M&A 38 0.373 *** *** 0.818
In-in M&A 345 0.081 0.565
Other firms 9627 0.086 0.528
R&D intensity 1998-R&D intensity 1994 Out-In M&A 30 0.672 1.769
(R&D intensity=R&D costs/workers） In-in M&A 110 0.181 0.884
Other firms 4021 0.115 0.715
R&D intensity 1998-R&D intensity 1994 Out-In M&A 30 0.010 0.040
（R&D intensity=R&D costs/sales） In-in M&A 110 0.006 0.028
Other firms 4021 0.003 0.020
Current profit per worker 1998 -current profit per worker 199 Out-In M&A 43 2.737 *** *** 9.254
In-in M&A 347 0.038 3.181
Other firms 9762 -0.183 3.475
Current profit-sales ratio 1998-current profit-sales ratio 1994 Out-In M&A 43 2.110 14.202
(before taxes) In-in M&A 347 -0.594 7.324
Other firms 9762 -0.934 19.202
Current profit-fixed asset ratio 1998 Out-In M&A 43 -75.003 405.065
 -Current profit-fixed asset ratio 1994 (before taxes) In-in M&A 347 -98.796 1179.638
Other firms 9762 -22.447 900.426
Growth rate of capital stock Out-In M&A 43 0.290 * ** 1.321
In-in M&A 347 0.127 0.902
Other firms 9762 0.071 0.579
Growth rate of tangible fixed assets Out-In M&A 43 0.280 ** ** 1.309
In-in M&A 347 0.116 0.896
Other firms 9762 0.071 0.569
Note: * shows that the average is significantly higher. ***1% level, **5% level and *10% level. 
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The test of average does not provide any clear evidence whether the TFP level of firms targeted by 
out-in M&A was higher in 1994 than that of other firms. However, in 1998, the TFP level of out-in M&A 
target firms was slightly positive, while that of in-in M&A target firms and other firms was negative. 
Moreover, out-in M&A target firms enjoyed a significantly higher TFP growth rate during the observation 
period than in-in M&A target firms, though no significant difference with all other firms (i.e. those that 
remained independent) can be observed. However, out-in M&A target firms did significantly better than 
not only in-in M&A target firms but also other firms in the following business performance indicators: the 
growth rates of sales, you mean in constant prices, i.e. inflation adjusted the growth rate of labor 
productivity, the growth rate of the wage level, the growth rate of current profits per worker. and the 
growth rate of capital stock. Higher also, though not statistically significantly so, were the growth rates of 
the capital labor ratio, and R&D intensity. Comparing in-in M&A target firms with non-targeted firms, no 
significant differences in their performance indicators can be observed.  
Looking at employment levels, we find that, as a result of the prolonged recession in Japan, the 
growth rate of the number of workers decreased for all three groups of companies during this period. The 
growth rate of the number of workers at out-in M&A target firms is -4% and it is lower than that of in-in 
M&A target firms (-3.9%) but slightly higher than that of the other non-targeted firms (-5%). But the 
statistical test can not show that the difference of employment growth between groups is significant. A 
priori, we would expect foreign firms to adjust workforces more drastically to demand fluctuations than 
domestically-owned firms where life-time employment practices are common. However, we found no 
  16evidence that this was the case, refuting the argument that improvements in productivity and profit rates 
were achieved through lay-off. 
To summarize: the tests of averages suggest that out-in target firms showed a higher growth rate of 
labor productivity during the observation period; they also enjoyed slightly higher TFP levels in 1998 and 
higher TFP growth rates during this period when compared with the other two groups of firms. What is 
more, the findings suggest that out-in M&A target firms actively invest in R&D, enjoy increased current 
profits, they did not reduce employment by more than non-M&A target firms, and they show a 
significantly higher growth in wages. This means that out-in M&A target firms invest more in equipment 
and R&D per worker, which helps them to raise labor productivity.  
The following criticism may be leveled against the above analysis: even if out-in M&A target firms 
are more productive and do invest more actively in equipment and R&D, the fact that they are more 
productive may not necessarily be the result of a transfer of business resources through M&A. Instead, it 
may be possible that foreign firms tend to choose more productive firms as M&A targets.
7  
In order to test this selection hypothesis, Table 4 compares the business performance indicators of 
M&A target firms before the take-over and other, non-targeted, firms during 1994–1996. The results, 
however, suggest that firms targeted by out-in M&As do not enjoy significantly higher TFP growth than 
other firms before being taken over. On the other hand, though, most other business indicators such as the 
growth rate of wages, R&D intensity, and current profits per worker of out-in M&A target firms indicate a 
                                                      
7 The regression analysis of the TFP level including firm fixed effects shows positive sign on the 
foreign-ownership dummy. Therefore, this argument does not apply to the TFP level.  
  17slightly better performance than other firms. This test is no more than a simple comparison before the 
event. However, this comparison hints at the possibility that companies may be targeting 
better-performing firms. 
















Growth rate of TFP over previous year  Out-In M&A 83 0.0202 0.1483
In-in M&A 680 0.0136 0.1071
Other firms 24370 0.0189 0.1203
Growth rate of capital-labor ratio over previous year Out-In M&A 83 0.0986 0.7572
In-in M&A 680 0.0225 0.4879
Other firms 24370 0.0224 0.4058
Growth rate of wage over previous year  Out-In M&A 83 0.1191 ** ** 0.4096
In-in M&A 680 0.0426 0.2432
Other firms 24370 0.0469 0.2545
Growth rate of no. of workers over previous year  Out-In M&A 83 0.0125 0.1274
In-in M&A 680 0.0020 * 0.1297
Other firms 24370 -0.0084 0.1280
Growth rate of labor productivity over previous year  Out-In M&A 78 0.1474 0.6414
In-in M&A 679 0.0696 0.4103
Other firms 24116 0.0884 0.4079
R&D intensity current year - R&D intensity preceding yeaOut-In M&A 54 0.0014 0.0168
(R&D intensity=R&D costs/sales) In-in M&A 230 -0.0005 0.0122
Other firms 10412 0.0003 0.0108
R&D intensity current year - R&D intensity preceding yeaOut-In M&A 54 13.6009 *** ** 59.2739
(R&D intensity=R&D costs/workers) In-in M&A 230 0.4504 34.0906
Other firms 10412 2.5847 42.7899
Current profit per worker current year - current profit pe Out-In M&A 83 1.2098 *** *** 4.3345
 worker preceding year  In-in M&A 678 0.2087 1.5491
Other firms 24286 0.1407 2.8744
Current profit/ sales ratio this year -current profit/sales Out-In M&A 83 1.4491 6.6375
 last year (before taxes) In-in M&A 678 0.3846 4.2605
Other firms 24286 0.2601 26.0705
Current profit/fixed asset ratio this year -current profit/ Out-In M&A 83-36.8018 294.1306
 asset ratio last year (before taxes) In-in M&A 678-17.4829 366.0023
Other firms 24286 -6.8998 1438.6160
Growth rate of capital stock Out-In M&A 83 0.1110 * 0.7651
In-in M&A 678 0.0240 0.4780
Other firms 24286 0.0142 0.3952
Growth rate of tangible fixed assets  Out-In M&A 83 0.1110 * 0.7559
In-in M&A 678 0.0241 0.4578
Other firms 24286 0.0205 0.3780
Note: * shows that the average is significantly higher. ***1% level, **5% level and *10% level. 
  185 Regression  Analysis 
Strictly speaking, the previous tests of averages only show changes in firms’ business indicators 
during the observation period. They do not tell us anything about the relationship between M&As and 
changes in these indicators. What is more, they also do not consider potential inter-industry differences. It 
is therefore theoretically possible that out-in M&A target firms show a superior performance simply 
because such M&As are concentrated in particular growth industries such as the chemical and the 
electrical machinery industries. In order to examine these issues, regression analyses including industry 
dummies are  conducted to investigate whether before M&A more productive firms are selected by 
foreign firms and to investigate whether M&As improve the performance of target firms. The 
specifications of the equation to be estimated are as follows: 
 
t i i t i mmy INDUSTRYdu Indicator Adummy M in out , 2 1994 , 1 0 , * * & β β α + + = −
 (2) 
t i t i
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mmy INDUSTRYdu Adummy inM in
Adummy inM out Indicator Indicator
, 3 , 2






− + + =
 (3) 
 
 In specification (2), the independent variable (Indicatori, 1994) consists of the business indicators of 
each firm in the year 1994. The dependent variable is a dummy for out-in. In specification (3), where the 
dependent variable (Indicatori, 1998) consists of the business indicators of each firm in the year 1998. The 
independent variables are the variables of each firm in 1994 (Indicatori,1994), a dummy for out-in M&As, a 
  19dummy for in-in M&As, and industry dummies using a 3-digit industry classification. The computer 
industry is used as the benchmark industry and has no industry dummy. The descriptive statistics is shown 
in Table 5.  Conducting regression analysis, it excludes the observations which belong to the industry in 
which any M&A did not occur.  
What kind of characters do the foreign firms value in the target firms before M&A?  The results of 
this question are summarized in Table 6a.  Our results show that the foreign firms select the local firms of 
which employment, capital stock, sales, R&D intensity and capital labor ratio are greater. However, TFP, 
labor productivity and current profits per worker of the target firms are not statistically high. The foreign 
firms make much of the facility or scale economies. They do not necessarily take great care of the ratio of 
efficiency, TFP or labor productivity.  By using the same specification we examined the character of in-in 
M&A target firms.  The results, summarized in the Table-6b, show that in-in M&A target firms have 
fewer workers and less R&D intensity. Odagiri and Hase (1988) found that Japanese firms in 1980’s 
aimed through in-in M&A mainly at business diversification or the continuation of firms in declining 
industries. The explanatory variables, we prepare here, could not test the business diversification so that 
the other paper should study.  
Turn to the effect of M&A. The results in Table 7 show clearly that out-in M&A target firms enjoyed 
a significantly higher TFP level in 1998, as the result of the transfer of business resources from the foreign 
parent firms. What is more, the coefficients on labor productivity, the capital labor ratio, the wage level, 
current profits per worker, and R&D costs per worker are positive and significant, suggesting that out-in 
M&As indeed improve the business efficiency of target firms through the transfer the business resources. 
  20In contrast, none of the indicators showed that in-in M&As improved the efficiency of target firms.  
 
 
Table 5.  Panel A Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Regression Analysis  
for M&A 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TFP 12339 -0.03 0.19 -2.23 1.17
Sales 12339 19155.01 129096.20 150.00 7827143.00
Labor Productivity 12339 5.54 4.00 -108.22 160.11
Capital Labor Ratio 12339 4.80 5.40 0.00 108.84
Wage 12339 4.52 1.69 0.05 17.01
No. of Workers 12339 455.97 1982.06 50.00 77185.00
Capital Stock 12339 3221.53 20412.67 0.26 873380.30
Fixed Asset 12339 6114.60 38638.50 1.00 1327445.00
R&D Costs per worker 6134 0.60 1.03 0.00 24.29
R&D Costs per Sales 6134 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.55
Current Profit per Worker 12339 0.77 3.01 -111.29 107.37
Current Profit per Sales 12339 1.92 12.77 -913.79 192.38
 
Table 5.  Panel B Numbers of M&As in Each Year 
1995 1996 1997 1998
No. of out-in M&As (firms) 0 1 6 36








  21Table 6-a. Probit Estimation for the Selection Hypothesis  
Dependent variable is a dummy for firms which merged with or were acquired by a foreign firm. 
TFP level in 1994 0.18845 Wage level in 1994 -0.002196 R&D Costs per worker  0.101169 ***
(0.54) (-0.06) in 1994 (3.35)
_cons -2.4665 *** _cons -2.46864 *** _cons -2.3573 ***
(-15.42) (-11.67) (-13.31)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674
Pseudo R^2 0.0436 Pseudo R^2 0.043 Pseudo R^2 0.0594
Labor Productivity  0.00307 Employments in 1994 0.0000334 R&D Costs per Sales  2.99152 **
in 1994 (0.29) (4.10) in 1994 (2.21)
_cons -2.4938 *** _cons -2.5087 *** _cons -2.3573 ***
(-14.78) (-15.6) (-13.31)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674
Pseudo R^2 0.043 Pseudo R^2 0.067 Pseudo R^2 0.0453
Sales in 1994 0.0004 *** Capital Stock in 1994 0.0004 *** Current Profits per Worker 0.0021326
(3.76) (3.76) in 1994 (0.14)
_cons -2.4911 *** _cons -2.4911 *** _cons -2.4796 ***
(-15.57) (-15.0) (-15.52)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674
Pseudo R^2 0.0637 Pseudo R^2 0.0637 Pseudo R^2 0.0431
Capital Labor Ratiio  0.02073 *** Fixed Asset in 1994 0.02073 *** Current Profits to Sales  -0.002557
in 1994 (3.42) (3.42) in 1994 (-0.50)
_cons -2.6293 *** _cons -2.6293 *** _cons -2.472012 ***
(-15.33) (-15.21) (-15.52)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674











  22Table 6-b. Probit Estimation for the Selection Hypothesis  
Dependent variable is a dummy for firms which merged with or were acquired by a local firm. 
TFP level in 1994 0.102149 Wage level in 1994 0.003292 R&D Costs per worker  -0.09288 *
(0.76) (0.23) in 1994 (-1.8)
_cons -1.69062 *** _cons -1.70911 *** _cons -1.79469 ***
(-21.17) (-17.27) (-14.87)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 12084 Number of observations 12084 Number of observations 6674
Pseudo R^2 0.0164 Pseudo R^2 0.0162 Pseudo R^2 0.0308
Labor Productivity  -0.00273 Employments in 1994 -0.000005 ** R&D Costs per Sales  -4.40705 **
in 1994 (-0.45) (-2.41) in 1994 (2.36)
_cons -1.68193 *** _cons -1.65601 *** _cons -1.75164 ***
(-19.77) (-20.41) (-14.18)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 12084 Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674
Pseudo R^2 0.0162 Pseudo R^2 0.0188 Pseudo R^2 0.0326
Sales in 1994 -0.000008 Capital Stock in 1994 -0.000004 Current Profits per Worker -0.00986
(-1.61) (-1.59) in 1994 (-1.47)
_cons -2.4911 *** _cons -1.68673 *** _cons -1.69 ***
(-15.57) (-20.99) (-21.21)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 12084 Number of observations 6674 Number of observations 6674
Pseudo R^2 0.0174 Pseudo R^2 0.0172 Pseudo R^2 0.0167
Capital Labor Ratiio  0.003536 Fixed Asset in 1994 -0.000002 Current Profits to Sales  -0.00123
in 1994 (0.92) (-1.47) in 1994 (-0.98)
_cons -1.71463 *** _cons -1.68673 *** _cons -1.69331 ***
(-20.85) (-21.13) (-21.27)
Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes Industry dummy yes
Number of observations 12084 Number of observations 12084 Number of observations 12084












  23Table 7.  OLS Estimation Results: the Effects of Out-In M&A, In-In M&A and the Other Firms 
 capital labor ratio
in 1998 in 1998 in 1998
0.0448 ** 0.3059 *** 0.0877 * 0.2092 **
(2.43) (4.66) (1.95) (2.51)
-0.0043 -0.0189 0.0121 0.0199
(-0.65) (-0.85) (0.75) (0.67)
_cons -0.0429 *** 1.0865 *** 0.5608 *** 0.5195 ***
(-8.44) (52.70) (23.13) (21.68)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 10142 10002 10142 10142
Adjusted R^2 0.6067 0.3267 0.9542 0.704
in 1998 in 1998
0.1551 *** 0.0136 0.2333 *** 0.2340 ***
(3.81) (0.39) (2.65) (2.69)
0.0220 0.0089 0.0272 0.0239
(1.51) (0.72) (0.86) (0.77)
_cons 0.9650 *** 0.1477 *** 0.9108 *** 0.8718 ***
(68.62) (9.01) (25.14) (23.84)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 10142 10142 10142 10142
Adjusted R^2 0.4151 0.0304 0.8654 0.8667
Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a foreign firm.
Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a domestic firm
Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a foreign firm.
Dummy for firms which merged with or





TFP level in 1998 Labor Productivity Constant Sales
 
0.6389 *** 0.0072 * 2.8790 *** 2.4448 5.7092
(4.81) (1.90) (5.55) (0.89) (0.11)
0.0602 0.0023 0.2072 -0.0466 -13.5021
(0.86) (1.15) (1.12) (-0.05) (-0.70)
_cons 0.3457 *** 0.0122 *** 0.2976 ** 0.6313 1.2888
(7.58) (9.23) (2.09) (0.83) (-0.09)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 4160 4161 10142 10142 10142
Adjusted R^2 0.6443 0.614 0.2218 0.0188 0.1575
Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a domestic firm
Dummy for firms which merged with or













Note: In the compilation of industry dummies, computer industry is treated as the benchmark industry without an 
industry dummy variable. 
 
Another factor that may play an important role in determining firms’ business efficiency is the 
number of years passed since an M&A. Therefore, we also include the following independent variables in 
the regression: the out-in M&A target firm dummy multiplied by the number of years since the M&A; 
and the in-in M&A target firm dummy multiplied by the number of years since the M&A. The results are 
summarized in Table 8.  
 
  24Table 8 OLS Estimation Results: Effects of Out-In M&A, In-In M&A and Other Firms: Including 




y Sales Capital labor ratio
in 1998 in 1998 in 1998 in 1998
0.0225 0.2311 *** 0.0271 0.1398 **
(1.54) (4.35) (0.76) (2.12)
-0.0006 0.0009 0.0058 0.0014
(-0.26) (0.13) (1.09) (0.15)
_cons -0.0428 *** 1.0857 *** 0.5600 *** 0.5208 ***
(-8.43) (52.66) (23.10) (21.73)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 10142 10002 10142 10142
Adjusted R^2 0.6067 0.3265 0.9541 0.704
in 1998 in 1998
0.1137 *** -0.0034 0.1364 ** 0.1373 **
(3.54) (-0.13) (1.96) (2.00)
0.0090 * 0.0074 * 0.0087 0.0075
(1.84) (1.82) (0.84) (0.73)
_cons 0.9649 *** 0.1465 *** 0.9113 *** 0.8723 ***
(68.62) (8.94) (25.15) (23.85)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 10142 10142 10142 10142
Adjusted R^2 0.4151 0.9503 0.8653 0.86666
0.4069 *** 0.0069 ** 1.8271 *** 1.1620 3.8305
(4.08) (2.44) (4.47) (0.53) (0.09)
0.0137 0.0005 0.0804 0.0216 -3.8693
(0.58) (0.77) (1.32) (0.07) (-0.61)
_cons 0.3489 *** 0.0122 *** 0.3010 ** 0.6342 1.2328
(7.64) (9.26) (2.11) (0.84) (0.08)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 4160 4161 10142 10142 10142
Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a foreign firm.
Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a domestic firm
Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a foreign firm.
Dummy for firms which merged with or













Dummy for firms which merged with or
were acquired by a foreign firm.
Dummy for firms which merged with or







Adjusted R^2 0.6437 0.6142 0.221 0.0188 0.1575  
Note: In the compilation of industry dummies, computer industry is treated as the benchmark industry without an 
industry dummy variable. 
 
  The estimation including the number of years since the M&A shows that the coefficient on the TFP level 
is not statistically significant. However, firms acquired by a foreign company show an increase in business 
efficiency, as indicated by higher labor productivity, R&D intensity, and current profits per worker. In 
contrast, the business performance indicators of in-in M&A targets do not show a significant 
improvement, although in comparison with other firms, the scale of their operations, as measured by the 
  25number of workers, increases.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Using firm level data of the Japanese manufacturing sector, this paper investigated what kind of 
characters the foreign firms value in the target firms before M&A, and investigated whether the 
technology transfer are there through out-in M&A.  
. Firstly, productivity and business performance indicators were compared between out-in firms and 
in-in firms. Secondly, it was investigated whether out-in M&As raise the performance of target firms.  
The results of the investigation can be summarized as follows.  
        Tests of averages which compare out-in firms and in-in firms show that as a whole the productivity 
and other performance indicators, such as labor productivity, the current profit-to-sales ratio, and the R&D 
intensity of out-in target firms are significantly higher than those of in-in M&A target firms.  
        The regression analysis showed the foreign firms value the facility and the scale of the target firms. 
Before M&A business efficiency such as TFP, and labor productivity is not statistically high. However, 
the regression analysis showed that firms acquired by foreign firms saw an improvement in their business 
efficiency after the acquisition. This finding suggests that out-in M&As involve a transfer of business 
resources or business know-how that help to further lift the efficiency of firms.  
These findings suggest that because foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestic ones, 
out-in M&As help to raise the productivity level of Japanese industry overall. Therefore, if the target set 
  26out by Prime Minister Koizumi
8 to double the cumulative amount of foreign direct investment is achieved, 
this would help to raise the productivity of the Japanese economy because out-in M&As lift the 
productivity of the acquired firms.  
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